---
title: "User Organization User Role Destroy"
method: DELETE
path: "/user/organization-user-role/{id}/"
tags: ["users"]
---

# User Organization User Role Destroy

`DELETE /user/organization-user-role/{id}/`

GET/PATCH/DELETE /api/users/member/<id>/

Retrieve, update, or delete organization member role.

Permission (via ObjectOwnershipMixin config in SuperAdminMixin):
- User can GET their OWN role (read-only)
- Org Admin can GET/PATCH/DELETE any role in org
- Superadmin: same as regular user (org-scoped, not cross-org)

Note: Member management is intentionally org-scoped even for superadmins.

Writes are admin-only. Every writable field on OrganizationUserRole
(role, permissions_override, pending, ...) is privilege-defining, so a
member must NOT be able to PATCH their own row — that is direct
self-escalation to admin/owner. ``is_requiring_org_admin_for_write``
enforces org-admin for any write while still letting members GET their
own role. Role changes go through this admin-gated path (the serializer
keeps fields writable for that flow); members have no legitimate
self-write field here.

## Path parameters

- `id` integer, required

## Headers

- `Authorization` string, required

## Response `200`

Successful response

---

[API](https://skmtc.net/keywordsai/apis/api-reference.md) · [All operations](https://skmtc.net/keywordsai/apis/api-reference/llms.txt) · [OpenAPI document](https://skmtc-service-staging.skmtc.workers.dev/v1/apis/keywordsai/api-reference/versions/c26d550029f8/schema)